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Abstract
We explore the impact of gender diversity and environmental committees on green-
house gas (GHG) voluntary disclosures utilising a sample of 215 firms, which are listed
on the London Stock Exchange market. We provide strong evidence for a strong posi-
tive association between GHG voluntary disclosures and gender diversity, which consti-
tutes an important input to the ongoing debate about the role of women in the
boardroom. The governance mechanism of environmental committees is not found to
significantly affect GHG disclosures. This adds to the growing empirical evidence in the
literature that questions the effectiveness of the current board structures in serving the
wider needs of stakeholders and in addressing the relevant issues on climate change.
Overall, our results suggest that by being diverse and open to a mixed-gender gover-
nance approach, a firm can better serve the demands of stakeholders and legitimise
their green credentials, thus gaining more trust from a broad range of stakeholders other
than their shareholders. The noneffectiveness of the environmental committees in
enhancing GHG voluntary disclosures demonstrates that firms may not have to directly
link the relevant governance mechanism to their disclosure decisions and practices.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
The composition of the board of directors in an organisation determines
its effectiveness in the decision-making process and helps attaining the
desired goals [Financial Reporting Council (FRC), 2012; Liao, Luo, &
Tang, 2014]. There is a broad consensus in the literature (see,
e.g., Carter, D'Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 2010; Post, Rahman, &
Rubow, 2011) that diversity in knowledge and professional skills as a
result of a diversity in age, cultural background, education and gender is
a crucial element of a board composition. Furthermore, diversity largely
contributes to the achievement of the organisational goals and
objectives (Bear, Rahman, & Post, 2010; Post et al., 2011). It is also
demonstrated (Robinson & Dechant, 1997) that organisations with
effective leadership and boards with a high problem-solving ability are
often characterised by diversity in the ranks of management. Female
directors provide better oversight of managerial actions, which leads to
a more reliable financial reporting (Hillman, Shropshire, &
Cannella, 2007). That is, a mixed-gender board of directors can enhance
the reporting standards through a more effective monitoring. In addi-
tion, Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng (2011) suggest that gender diversity leads to
an improvement of the governance structure of an organisation by
changing the nature and dynamics of board deliberations that make
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board members pay greater attention to the consequences of their deci-
sions. Moreover, there is evidence that socially responsible firms are
likely to have gender diverse boards compared to their nonsocially
responsible counterparts. There is also evidence that women are more
sympathetic to socially responsible initiatives than men (Bernardi,
Bosco, & Vassill, 2006; Williams, 2003). In this vein, Ciocirlan and
Pettersson (2012) conclude when women on board has a positive and
significant effect on a company's commitment towards climate change.
Prior literature suggests that the establishment of an environmen-
tal committee in an organisation is a clear indication of its intent to
engage in environmental and climate change matters (see,
e.g., Peters & Romi, 2014; Liao et al., 2014). Amran, Ooi, Nejati,
Zulkafli, and Lim (2012) argue that special committees such as the
environmental committee is always regarded as an important human
capital resource element that cultivates responsible management and
rallies the organisation into action. Environmental committees consti-
tute what is known as an environmental governance mechanism in an
organisation meant for either ceremonial conformity or substantive
intent to reign on relevant matters (Rodrigue, Magnan, & Cho, 2013).
Despite the growing interest around the world by both public and
private sectors in enhancing firms' greenhouse gas (GHG) voluntary
disclosure,1 the latter mainly remains at the discretion of board of
directors in an organisation. Contrary to the ample research on the
impact of corporate governance on voluntary disclosures such as
social responsibility (early studies are those of Aguilera, Williams, Con-
ley, & Rupp, 2006; Kolk & Pinkse, 2009; Bear et al., 2010), the role of
governance mechanisms on GHG disclosure practices remains largely
unexplored (e.g., Galbreath, 2011; Liao et al., 2014; Prado-Lorenzo &
Garcia-Sanchez, 2010; Rodrigue et al., 2013). In addition, even though
there is a growing evidence that female shareholders champion green
issues in their firms, their influence on GHG voluntary reporting at the
board level has not yet been thoroughly explored. Along these lines,
the effect of board gender on sustainability remains under-researched
(Galbreath, 2011; Ricart, Rodriguez, & Sanchez, 2005).
In this paper, we intend to fill the relevant gaps in the literature by
investigating how governance characteristics affect the GHG voluntary
disclosures. More concretely, we examine the impact of gender diver-
sity in the board of directors and the creation of environmental commit-
tees on GHG voluntary disclosures drawn from multiple sources of
disclosure. These two corporate governance mechanisms are not explic-
itly guided by any formal code of practice other than boards' own initia-
tives to reposition themselves to emerging issues. For example, even
though the UK Combined Code (FRC, 2012) contained specific guid-
ance on board independence, board size, audit, remuneration, and nomi-
nation committees, there was no explicit provision for the creation of
environmental committees. As regards gender diversity, the code sig-
nalled the need for organisations to demonstrate their gender diversity
without yet imposing any specific requirements on this.
We use a sample of 215 firms, which are listed on the London
Stock Exchange (LSE) market in our empirical analysis. We refer to a
research index methodology to quantify GHG voluntary disclosures in
firms' annual reports, sustainability reports and websites over a 4-year
period. We control for all the relevant governance characteristics
(board size, proportion of non-executive directors (NEDs), ownership
concentration, director ownership, audit committee, board meetings
and CEO duality), as well as for some key firm-level characteristics
(size, gearing, profitability, liquidity, firm age, financial slack and capital
expenditure). We also control for industry-level characteristics such as
the participation of our sample firms in the Carbon Disclosure Project
(CDP). Our study brings useful insights into the GHG research: unlike
previous studies that were cross-sectional and had an exclusive focus
on CDP reports (see, e.g., Liao et al., 2014), our study is longitudinal
and hinges upon content analysis of annual reports, sustainability
reports and firms' websites, which allow us to examine the various
trends in GHG voluntary disclosures. The focus on a wide range of
disclosure sources enables us to present a comprehensive overview
of the relevant trends in the area of research as opposed to other
studies whose focus is on one particular source.
Our key findings indicate that board gender diversity is positively
and significantly associated with GHG voluntary disclosures whereas
environmental committees in an organisation do not significantly affect
GHG disclosures. Corporate governance structure such as ownership as
well as firm-level characteristics (size, gearing, profitability, financial slack
and firm age) exerts a significant impact on GHG disclosures. Overall,
our results suggest that by being diverse and open to a mixed-gender
governance approach, a firm can better serve the demands of stake-
holders and legitimise their green credentials, thus gaining more trust
from a broad range of stakeholders (Rupley, Brown, & Marshall, 2012).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2
reviews the literature and develops the relevant research hypotheses.
The research design is presented in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the
empirical results and the relevant business implications. A set of
robustness tests are carried out in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the
paper and outlines areas of future research.
2 | LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 | Theoretical framework
The role of governance mechanisms such as the board gender diver-
sity and environmental committees in GHG disclosures can be reg-
arded from different theoretical viewpoints, which often overlap with
each other (Chen & Roberts, 2010; Liao et al., 2014). The key view-
points hinge upon the stakeholder, resource dependency and legiti-
macy theories.
Freeman (1984, p. 46) defines a stakeholder as ‘any group or individ-
ual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisa-
tion's objectives’. The stakeholder theory is focused on the stakeholders
of a firm and their competing priorities (Freeman, Harrison, &
Wicks, 2007; Shahab et al., 2020). A firm creates value by interacting
1The GHG reporting became mandatory for all LSE-listed companies for reporting years
ending on or after September 30, 2013. Earlier initiatives were those of the Australia's
National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting (NGER) Act of 2007, the introduction of a GHG
emission reporting scheme in Canada, and the Japanese Mandatory GHG accounting and
reporting system.
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with stakeholders in a reciprocal dependency network (Freeman
et al., 2007). Reciprocity places a moral obligation on firms to strike a bal-
ance between the priorities of stakeholders (Huang & Kung, 2010).
There is growing evidence that stakeholders are concerned with how
firms manage their actions towards environmental issues (Cormier, Gor-
don, & Magnan, 2004; Henriques & Sadorsky, 1999). Firms gradually
engage in environmental governance initiatives in an effort to address
these concerns. According to Rodrigue et al. (2013), environmental gov-
ernance refers to the board's initiatives that go beyond the formal gover-
nance mechanisms as dictated by the relevant institutional framework.
Such initiatives may involve the set-up of a special committee on envi-
ronmental issues or the establishment of a diverse boards in terms of
gender to ensure that environmental concerns are addressed.
Board diversity and the creation of environment committees can
also be viewed through the lenses of the resource dependency theory,
which has its origins in the seminal study of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978)
that demonstrates how an organisation's behaviour is shaped by the
need to procure external resources from the environment. This theory
shifts the focus of the relation between ownership and management to
the company's links with its environment. That is, under the resource
dependence theory, it is assumed that boards serve to link the company
to other external organisations in order to address environmental
dependencies (Reguera-Alvarado, de Fuentes, & Laffarga, 2017). As
Tyrowicz, Terjesen, and Mazurek (2020) mention, the resource depen-
dency theory explores how boards aim to reduce uncertainty by
appointing corporate directors who can maximise access to valuable
resources required by the firm. In a similar vein, Carter et al. (2010)
argue that the resource dependency theory provides a reasonable basis
for justifying diversity on a firm's board, which contributes to a more
effective decision making. For example, boards can appoint directors
who are business experts, support specialists and community
influencers (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000). Compared to their
male counterparts, female directors are more likely to have advanced
degrees and nonbusiness backgrounds and to join multiple boards faster
(Hillman, Cannella, & Harris, 2002). Furthermore, female directors can
help to link up a firm with important constituents of its environment
because they nowadays make up a significant portion of the human
capital/workforce. Women are also not considered to be part of an ‘old
boys’ club and hence are viewed to be more independent from men
(Brennan & McCafferty, 1997).
Legitimacy theory refers to the view that organisations and societies
are engaged in a social contract, where the former are recognised by the
latter as being socially responsible (O'Donovan, 2002). An organisation
has to demonstrate that it meets the societal standards of legitimacy
(Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007). Legitimacy is defined as a perception ‘… that
the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions’
(Suchman, 1995, p. 574). Companies manage corporate social responsi-
bility (CSR) reporting to gain legitimacy (De Villiers & Van Staden, 2006).
Legitimacy theory focuses on how board gender diversity and environ-
mental performance are used by companies to obtain approval on their
decisions from the broader society, which is expected to enable compa-
nies to be successful and sustainable (Elmagrhi, Ntim, Elamer, &
Zhang, 2019; Haque & Ntim, 2018; Torchia, Calabrò, & Huse, 2011).
Firms can gain legitimacy and secure access to financial/nonfinancial
resources (Shahab, Ntim, Chengang, Ullah, & Fosu, 2018) by adhering to
these environmentally friendly rules and regulations.
2.2 | Hypotheses development
2.2.1 | Board gender diversity and GHG voluntary
disclosures
There is an increasing interest in women's participation on the boards
of firms in the relevant literature. However, the contribution of female
directors and board members on companies' decisions remains largely
under-researched (Nielsen & Huse, 2010, p. 136). The presence of
women in a board of directors can bring a different perspective to the
governance and the decision-making process of a company. From a
leadership perspective, it is widely acknowledged that directors are
often high-skilled individuals who bring to the boardroom their leader-
ship styles. In this respect, boards that consist of more female direc-
tors are likely to display leadership styles, which are more closely
linked to their gender. Eagly, Johannesen-Schmidt, and Van
Engen (2003) identify agentic and communal attributes as being areas
where men and women exhibit several differences. Agentic character-
istics like being assertive, aggressive, ambitious, daring, competitive,
independent and self-confident are mainly associated with men,
whereas communal behaviours like being helpful, sensitive, nurturing,
kind and sympathetic are primarily linked to women (Nielsen &
Huse, 2010). Furthermore, Eagly et al. (2003) show that, when in lead-
ership, women are less hierarchical, more cooperative and collabora-
tive and look for opportunities to uplift and enhance other employers'
worth. Jaffee and Hyde (2000) use a sample of 160 independent
research papers that show that women are more likely to use more
care reasoning (i.e., responding to the needs of others and feeling a
responsibility not to hurt other people) than men. In addition, women
are found to be more aware of situations requiring ethical judgement
than men (Forte, 2004; Smith, Wokutch, Harrington, & Dennis, 2001).
Huse and Solberg (2006) find that women are known to be more
committed and diligent in the tasks that are involved with. Other stud-
ies (e.g., Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2008; Carter, Simkins, &
Simpson, 2003) show that women's participation in the board of
directors is associated with a good financial performance. Regarding
the environmental issues, women are found to demonstrate a genuine
concern compared to men and are likely to champion initiatives, which
reduce a company's environmental risks (Diamantopoulos,
Schlegelmilch, Sinkovics, & Bohlen, 2003; Fukukawa, Shafer, &
Lee, 2007). De Villiers, Naiker, and Van Staden (2011) provide strong
evidence of associations between environmental performance and
board characteristics.2 Bear et al. (2010) and Post et al. (2011) show
2The study of De Villiers et al. (2011) focuses on board characteristics like the independence
of the board members, the concentration of the directors appointed after the CEO, the board
size, how active CEOs are and the expertise of the board members in legal issues. Our study,
on the other hand, sheds the light on the board gender diversity.
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that when three (or more) women are in the board of directors, the
disclosure documents are more closely linked to social and environ-
mental issues. We can therefore form the following hypothesis:
H1. Gender board diversity exerts a positive impact on GHG volun-
tary disclosures.
2.2.2 | Environmental committees
Prior empirical disclosure literature has investigated the role of gov-
ernance structures such as audit committees, or social and environ-
mental committees in information disclosure practices (Berthelot &
Robert, 2012; Eng & Mak, 2003). The effectiveness of the board of
directors does not only depend on the board's composition but also
depend on its governance structure. Neu, Warsame, and
Pedwell (1998) state that the establishment of an environmental
committee is a signal to the stakeholders of the firm's concern
about all the relevant issues. In this vein, the study of Rankin
et al. (2011, p. 1047) indicates that the presence of such commit-
tees demonstrates ‘evidence of proactive corporate governance to
guide the organisational long-term strategy towards a more carbon-
constrained future’. Lorsch and MacIver (1989) argue that the sub-
groups of directors that form the relevant committees enable them
to consider issues of interest more thoroughly than a full board
would consider.
Whereas board committees such as audit and remuneration com-
mittees has always been a tradition in a board's governance structure,
environmental committees are a reasonably new establishment.
Michals (2009) notes that firms have been lately turned to designate
specialised committees to address the key environmental issues,
which are related to their operation and strategic planning. Peters and
Romi (2014) suggest that an environmental committee can be equally
important to an audit committee in as far as environmental informa-
tion is concerned.
There is evidence in the literature on the influence of environ-
mental committees on GHG disclosures and climate change. Such
specialised committees advocate the disclosures of GHG informa-
tion to the stakeholders and to the public, championing at the same
time in the implementation of long-term strategies on climate
change. Cowen, Ferreri, and Parker (1987) conclude that information
disclosure is positively associated with the existence of a CSR com-
mittee in a firm. Berthelot and Robert (2012) conclude that the
Canadian oil and gas companies that have an environmental com-
mittee demonstrate a higher level of GHG disclosures. Similarly,
Peters and Romi (2014) find that GHG emission accounting disclo-
sures are positively linked to board governance structures, which
include environmental committees. In contrast, no relation between
the presence of a CSR committee and the related disclosures is
documented in Rupley et al. (2012).
H2. The presence of an environmental committee is positively asso-
ciated with GHG disclosures.
3 | DATA AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 | Sample selection
Our sample consists of 215 firms, which are all traded on the LSE and
are listed on the UK FTSE 350 index. We focus on UK FTSE 350 as it
covers a wide range of industries and indexes the largest firms that
are expected to take the lead in GHG voluntary disclosures and to
support gender diversity (Davies, 2014). Brammer and Pavelin (2006)
suggest that the use of large firms from several different industries
allows a comprehensive review of disclosures and, importantly, a rea-
sonable generalisation of the obtained results. Our sample period
extends from 2011 to 2014. This is the period that the majority of the
FTSE 350 firms started to disclose their GHG emissions on a volun-
tary basis in line with Department for Environment, Food, and Rural
Affairs's (DEFRA, 2009) guidance.
All the 93 financial services firms (i.e., banks, insurance firms,
investment trusts, unit trusts and real estate firms) are excluded from
our sample because they are subjected to different disclosure rules
and statutory requirements that affect their accounting strategies, dis-
closure decisions and corporate governance structures (Mangena &
Tauringana, 2007). To ensure comparability of our results, we also
exclude those firms with unpublished annual reports or missing data
mainly as a result of mergers and acquisitions. Finally, we exclude the
firms that are not listed on the UK FTSE 350 for the entire period of
study, as well as the subsidiary firms whose parent companies are
listed the FTSE 350.
3.2 | Dependent variable: Quantifying the GHG
voluntary disclosure
To construct our dependent variable, we draw a GHG disclosure list
of items. Unlike previous studies (e.g., Prado-Lorenzo, Rodriguez-
Dominquez, Gallego-Alvarez, & Garcia-Sanchez, 2009), which base
their lists on a single GHG disclosure guidance, we include all the
items from several various GHG reporting documents: the Green-
house Gas Protocol (2004), the Global Reporting Initiative (2006),
DEFRA (2009), the Global Framework for Climate Risk Disclo-
sure (2006), and the Climate Disclosure Standard Board (2010). The
final index has 60 items in total; 34 items are related to qualitative dis-
closures, and the remaining 26 items are linked to quantitative disclo-
sures. This checklist is comparatively broader and more
comprehensive than previous studies. Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009)
have a checklist of 19 items; Choi, Lee, and Psaros (2013) have
18 items; Freedman and Jaggi (2005) have only five items related to
GHG disclosures and global warming.
To quantify the GHG disclosures, we conduct a content analysis,
which is widely used in the disclosure literature (see, e.g., Mangena &
Tauringana, 2007; Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009). Literature suggests
that the quantification of disclosure can occur on either a weighted or
an unweighted basis. However, the two approached are not expected
to produce substantially different results (Gray, Kouhy, &
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Lavers, 1995). We adopt the unweighted approach as this is more
appropriate when no different weights are assigned to any of our user
groups (Cooke, 1989). A score of ‘1’ is given to an item disclosed by
the firm, and a score of ‘0’ is assigned to a nondisclosed item. How-
ever, the firm is not penalised if an item does not apply. The total dis-
closure index score is then measured for each of our sample firms as
the ratio of the total disclosure score divided by the maximum possi-
ble disclosure score for the firm. The disclosure index for each firm is
then expressed as a percentage.
3.3 | Independent variables
Based on prior literature (De Villiers et al., 2011; De Villiers & Van
Staden, 2011; Liao et al., 2014; Peters & Romi, 2014; Post
et al., 2011; Rankin et al., 2011), we account for a set of governance
variables: board size, CEO duality, audit committee, NEDs, ownership
concentration, director ownership and frequency of board meetings.
Our selection of these variables is informed by the Combined Code
(FRC, 2012), which encourages firms to have boards of sufficient size,
dominated by independent NEDs, and with distinctive chairman and
chief executive roles. The code also requires from boards to have an
audit committee to provide oversight of financial reporting and also a
remuneration committee.
Following the literature (Berthelot & Robert, 2012; Brammer &
Pavelin, 2006; Freedman & Jaggi, 2005; Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009;
Rankin et al., 2011; Stanny & Ely, 2008), we also control for firm size,
profitability and gearing. Size is regarded as a proxy for organisational
visibility, which exposes a firm to intense public scrutiny resulting in
greater responsiveness towards environmental and GHG issues
(Henriques & Sadorsky, 1999). We also incorporate a variable that
captures liquidity in our model on the basis that highly liquid compa-
nies are expected to have adequate resources that enable them to
manage climate change challenges. We also control for financial slack,
capital expenditure, firm age and industry effects. Firms with financial
slack are expected to channel resources into environmental or climate
change initiatives including disclosure (Kock, Santalo, &
Diestre, 2012). In line with De Villiers et al. (2011), we also control for
the status of a firm's capital equipment in property, plant and equip-
ment because firms with modern equipment are considered to have
the capacity to control their emissions better than those with older
equipment (De Villiers & Van Staden, 2011).
Regarding the age of a firm, literature (Clarkson, Richardson, &
Vasvari, 2008; De Villiers et al., 2011) shows that older firms are
deemed as being established well enough to have resources to invest
in climate change issues compared to younger firms, which are likely
to need to invest their resources in more pressing day-to-day business
activities. Along these lines, older firms appear to have the time and
knowledge to establish extensive stakeholder networks and research
centres that can deal with various issues like the environmental issues.
Therefore, stakeholders can benefit from these networks and can help
to set the pace for disclosure (Alsaeed, 2006; Kang & Gray, 2011).
Finally, prior studies (Kolk, Levy, & Pinkse, 2008; Liao et al., 2014;
Peters & Romi, 2014; Stanny & Ely, 2008) provide evidence that par-
ticipation in CDP incentivises a firm to disclose its GHG emissions.
We, hence, introduce participation in CDP as an additional control
variable in our model.
3.4 | Empirical model
We employ a fixed-effects modelling technique to capture the possi-
ble variation across different firms and also to deal with variation over
time (Baltagi, 1995; Inchausti, 1997). Importantly, this technique
enables us to take omitted or unobserved variables into account and
to control for unobserved heterogeneity among the sample firms. Our
theoretical model is as follows:
Yit = αi + x
0
itβ + μit, ð1Þ
where Yit is the GHG-disclosure index; xit are all the key independent
and control variables; αi stands for firm fixed effects; β is a set of vec-
tor parameters and μit is a random variable. i shows the number of
firms in our sample and, hence, takes values in the closed interval [1,
…, 215]; t equals to 1 for 2011, 2 for 2012, 3 for 2013 and 4 for
2014.
If we account for time fixed effects, Equation 1 is written as
follows:
Yit= αi + γt + x
0
itβ + μit, ð2Þ
where γt represents the time fixed effects.
This model gives both the group-specific dummies and time
dummies. The final model is, therefore, as follows:
Yit= αi + β
fb:xfb it + β
ec:xec it + β
aud:xaud it + β
ceod:xceod it + β
ned:xned it
+ βbm:xbm it + β
bs:xbs it + β
do:xdo it + xoosβ
ow:xow it + β
s:xs it + β
gea:
xgea it + β
roa:xroa it + β
liq:xliq it + β
fslack:xfslacki + β
capex:xcapexit + β
fage:
xfage it + β
ind:xind it + β
cdp:xcdp it +
X4
αt + μit
ð3Þ
where αt are intercept variables that change from year to year. They
capture the difference between years, assuming the individual sample
members are homogeneous. All other variables are defined in Table 1.
4 | EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.1 | Descriptive statistics
The pooled data (2011–2014) descriptive statistics of both the depen-
dent and independent variables are presented in Table 2. The results
indicate that the firms' GHG voluntary disclosure scores ranged from
0% to a maximum of 88.3% but overall, the mean disclosure for the
4 years is 32.45%, an indication that the extent of GHG disclosures by
FTSE350 companies is still low. When disaggregated per year (tables
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not included here), the disclosures display an increasing trend over
the period. For example, in 2011, the mean score was 25.2% (with a
minimum of 0 and maximum of 78.3%), and this increased to 30.8%
and 35.2% in 2012 and 2013, respectively. The increase in GHG
voluntary disclosures between 2011 and 2012 has partly been attrib-
uted to policy initiatives taken by the UK government to promote
measurement and reporting of GHG emissions, in particular, the issu-
ance of DEFRA guidance on GHG reporting (Tauringana &
Chithambo, 2015). In the period between 2012 and 2014, the
increase is marginal with a mean score of 35.2% in 2012 increasing to
38.5% in 2014.
The results of the independent variables indicate that out of an
average of nine directors per board, only one is likely to be a female
director, an indication of all male-dominated boards on FTSE350
firms. In line with other prior findings, it would appear not much pro-
gress has been made in ensuring that FTSE350 boards are gender
diverse. A study by Davies (2014) noted that although there was a
slight improvement in a number of female directors on FTSE350
boards, this has slightly gone down over time, especially in 2014. Not-
withstanding this, our sample shows an increasing trend in women
directors over the period moving from a total of 139 in 2011 to
205 in 2014. Over the 4 years, a total of 78 firms (representing almost
36% of the sample) reported having just one female director on their
board, a fact that is often referred to as ‘tokenism’ (Branson, 2006).
Only 55 (25% of the sample) firms reported having two or more
female directors. In terms of firm-years board of directors, we have a
total of 7,921 directors over the 4 years, and out of this, only
675 were women (representing almost 8.5%). Overall, out of a total of
1,966 directors in 2014, only 205 were female representing 10.4% of
the directorship.3
On average, nine board meetings are held each year, and 7.9% of
the sampled firms had instituted an environmental board committee.
The results also show that the companies have low levels of manage-
rial ownership as indicated by a mean of 5.46% and moderate levels
of ownership concentration (OWCON) as suggested by the mean of
40.23% over the 4 years. The firms' size (measured by total assets)
has a wider range and greater variability over the years. For example,
total assets ranged from £40 million to £345,257 million with a mean
of £9,594.02 million and standard deviation of £31,638.9 million. On
average, the majority of the sampled firms were highly geared (mean
of 1.52) over the 4 years. In general, firms are profitable (with a mean
ROA of 8.97) and demonstrate a sound liquidity position (liquidity
ratio of 1.61 on average). The sample is drawn from nine industries,
mostly industrials (28.3%) and consumer services (24.6%). Table 3
shows the correlations between the variables. Most of the indepen-
dent variables are significantly correlated with the dependent variable
(GHG voluntary disclosure). There is no indication of multicollinearity
(the highest correlation among independent variables was between
the audit committee and board size at −0.51). According to
Field (2009), correlation of independent variables of above 0.8 is a
TABLE 1 Variable measurement description
Symbol Full name Measurement
Yit GHG disclosure index Disclosure score expressed as a
ratio of the total possible
score, that is, 60
Xfb Board gender diversity Proportion of female members
on the board of directors,
that is, number of female
directors expressed as % of
total board size
Xec Environmental
committee
Presence of an environmental
committee coded as 1 if a
firm has one, otherwise 0
Xceod CEO duality Dummy coded as 1 if a firm's
CEO and Board Chair
position are occupied by one
individual, otherwise 0
xned Non-executive
directors (NEDs)
Ratio of NEDs on the board
xbm Board meeting Number of board meetings held
in a year
xbs Board size Number of people making up
the board of a company
xdo Director or insider
ownership
Proportion of shares held by
directors
xow Ownership
concentration
Proportion of ownership by
shareholders with 3% or
more
xs Company size Total assets expressed as
natural log
xgea Gearing Ratio between total debt and
total shareholders' equity
xroa Profitability Profit after tax, divided by total
assets
xliq Liquidity Current assets, divided by
current liabilities
xfslack Financial slack Measured as cash and cash
equivalents divided by total
sales
xcapex Capital expenditure Total capital divided by total
sales
xfage Firm age Firm age expressed as a natural
log of the period the
company has been listed on
LSE
xind Industry Dummy indicating 1 if in
environmentally sensitive
industry, otherwise 0
Xcdp Carbon Disclosure
Project (CDP)
Dummy indicating 1 if a firm
participated in CDP and
otherwise 0
Abbreviations: GHG, greenhouse gas; LSE, London Stock Exchange.
3Results are in line with other prior studies. For instance Adams and Ferreira (2009) found
that women constituted 8.87% of directorship on their sample of 125,319 directorships
(firm-year board positions). Farrell and Hersch (2005) had 8.6% female directorship in a
sample of 300 unregulated Fortune 500 firms in the period 1990–1999. Liao et al. (2014)
reported that women only accounted for 9.2% of board members on FTSE350 companies in
2011.
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cause of concern; hence, the correlation between board size and audit
committee is considered to have less impact on the overall result.
However, according to Myers (1990), a certain degree of
multicollinearity can still exist even when none of the correlation
coefficients is substantial. Therefore, we also examined the variance
inflation factors (VIFs) in our models to further test for
multicollinearity. Our mean VIF was 2.19, and this confirms that
multicollinearity is not a main concern in our sample.4
4.2 | Multivariate results and discussion
4.2.1 | Baseline estimation
Table 4 presents the baseline results on the relationship between
board gender diversity, environmental committee and GHG voluntary
disclosure. Evidence from column 1 of Table 4 model 1a indicates that
board gender diversity has a significant positive impact on the extent
of GHG voluntary disclosures. As a result, our hypothesis 1 (H1) in
respect of board gender diversity is confirmed. However, contrary to
our prediction, the presence of an environmental committee does not
have a significant impact on GHG disclosures. This means that our
hypothesis 2 (H2) is not supported. In terms of control variables, cor-
porate governance variable (director ownership) and company-specific
control variables (size, gearing and financial slack, firm age, CDP par-
ticipation, industry sectors of basic materials, industrials and consumer
services) all have a significant effect on GHG voluntary disclosures. All
other control variables have no significant effect on GHG voluntary
disclosures. The model explains 41% of the variation in the extent of
GHG disclosures.
The confirmation that board gender diversity is significantly asso-
ciated with the extent of GHG voluntary disclosures is consistent with
the notion that women are known to be more concerned with envi-
ronmental issues than men (Forte, 2004; Post et al., 2011; Smith
et al., 2001). Our results are consistent with prior research (e.g., Bear
et al., 2010; Liao et al., 2014) but contradict the evidence by Prado-
Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez (2010) who found that gender diversity
had a nonsignificant positive effect in all of their models investigating
the role of governance on GHG disclosure. Though the number of
female directors is less than 10.0% of the total directors, our results
suggest that their presence is not just mere tokenism.5 Firms with
female directors stand to benefit from an extensive linkage with other
TABLE 2 Descriptive statistics—aggregate (2011–2014)
N = 860 firm-year observations
Variables Mean SD Min Max Skewness Kurtosis
Disclosure 0.3245 0.2236 0 0.8833 0.6606 2.3707
Board gender diversity 0.781 0.8528 0.000 4.000 0.938 3.321
Environmental committee 0.0729 0.2602 0.000 1.000 3.285 11.793
Board size 9.1891 2.6182 4 31 1.4347 8.7902
Non-Exec. 0.6515 0.1118 0.2857 0.9285 −0.2629 2.7461
Board meetings 8.6194 2.6374 2 26 1.061 6.846
CEO duality 0.0231 0.1505 0 1 6.3422 41.2237
Audit committee (no) 3.583 0.912 2 8 0.2594 3.3753
Director Own. 5.4573 13.2501 0 85.37282 2.9868 11.5893
Ownership concentration 40.2311 17.8013 3.55 91.47 0.1689 2.4692
Size £9,594.02m 31,638.99 £40.0m £345,257m 7.0611 60.7393
Gearing 1.5219 12.5195 0.0208 246.2383 15.4521 255.2499
Profitability 8.9738 11.5724 −84.6 120.388 1.1108 30.3831
Liquidity 1.6165 1.7014 0.1858 27.2794 7.4616 90.2653
Financial slack 0.7089 6.6875 0 104.2206 11.9557 154.5711
Capital expenditure 0.2089 0.9799 0 17.648 11.1573 155.1897
Firm age 23.6179 20.6193 0 80 0.8559 2.4995
4Furthermore, we carried out both the Breusch–Pagan/Cook–Weisberg tests for
heteroskedasticity and the white's test for homoscedasticity to detect the presence of
heteroskedasticity, which if not controlled may render the standard errors and any tests
associated with them false. In both cases, the test statistic was highly significant indicating
the presence of heterokedasticity. According to Berry and Feldman (1985),
heteroskedasticity can be controlled through various means including variable transformation
and the use of robust standard errors. In this paper, both options have been used; some
variables notably size and board size were transformed logarithmically and again the option
of robust was used in Stata 12.
4The benefits of having female directors on boards cannot be obtained if female directors are
appointed to the board as token (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Torchia et al., 2011; Liao
et al., 2014). Insights from critical mass theory suggests that just having one or two women
on board may not be enough to exert significant influence (Konrad, Kramer, & Erkut, 2008;
Kramer, Konrad, & Erkut, 2006) because under social or group pressure, minorities are
coerced into conforming to the wishes of the majority (Nemeth, 1986). There is also the
tendency of treating minorities as tokenism when their numbers are very few, and this may
lead to these people being given less ceremonial duties (Brewer & Kramer, 1985). When the
number begins to increase to three or more and that these consistently present a common
view on an issue, then groups tend to consider their opinions in their decisions.
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TINGBANI ET AL. 9
stakeholders, diverse range of advice and that they are good at acting
and communicating their initiatives meant at legitimising their opera-
tions (Hillman et al., 2007).
The presence of environmental committee had no significant pos-
itive effect on GHG voluntary disclosures. This contradicts our theo-
retical framework explanation, which suggests more disclosures by
firms with such a committee and other prior studies (e.g., Peters &
Romi, 2014). However, it is consistent with the findings of Liao
et al. (2014) who found that environmental committees of FTSE
350 companies did not have a significant effect on the extent of car-
bon disclosures. One reason could be that although social and envi-
ronmental committees are being entrenched within FTSE350
companies, they are yet to find their feet in as far as GHG voluntary
disclosures are concerned. Rankin et al. (2011) who also found the
presence of environmental committee to be nonsignificant argued
that firms might just be creating these portfolios just to gain legiti-
macy, but in reality, real power and authority to achieve genuine GHG
emissions reductions has not been given to them. The other reason
TABLE 4 Baseline estimation
Model 1a. All Model 1b. Qualitative Model 1c. Quantitative
GHG disclosure (DV) Coefficient Robust SE Coefficient Robust SE Coefficient Robust SE
Board gender diversity 0.3105****** 0.0799 0.2488****** 0.0831 0.3912****** 0.0866
Environmental com. 0.0484 0.0303 0.0541 0.0292 0.0409 0.0339
Board size 0.0053 0.0041 0.0042 0.0042 0.0068 0.0043
Non-executive directors −0.0667 0.0727 −0.0782 0.0769 −0.0517 0.0765
Board meetings 0.0033 0.0026 0.0026 0.0027 0.0041 0.0028
CEO Duality −0.0524 0.0532 −0.0324 0.0582 −0.0785 0.0595
Audit committee −0.0008 0.0004 −0.1014 0.0814 −0.0681 0.0814
Director ownership −0.002****** 0.0005 −0.002****** 0.0006 −0.0019****** 0.0005
Ownership concent. −0.0007 0.0004 −0.0009 0.0005 −0.00066 0.0004
Size 0.0540****** 0.0066 0.0614****** 0.0070 0.0443****** 0.0072
Gearing −0.001****** 0.0002 −0.001****** 0.0001 −0.0008****** 0.0002
Profitability 0.0006 0.0005 0.0008 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005
Liquidity 0.0074 0.0044 0.0079 0.0048 0.0066 0.0042
Financial slack −0.0012**** 0.0006 −0.0012 0.0006 −0.0011**** 0.0005
Capital expenditure 0.0075 0.0110 0.0128 0.0110 0.0005 0.0116
Firm age −0.0138**** 0.0068 −0.0197**** 0.0072 −0.0058 0.0071
CDP participation 0.0985****** 0.0145 0.0955****** 0.0149 0.1024****** 0.0157
Industrials 0.1169****** 0.0284 0.1279****** 0.0286 0.1026****** 0.0311
Consumer services 0.0828****** 0.031 0.0846**** 0.0309 0.0804**** 0.0334
Oil & gas 0.056 0.0356 0.0558 0.0386 0.057 0.0351
Basic materials 0.0901**** 0.0352 0.0725**** 0.0357 0.11299****** 0.0375
Consumer goods 0.016 0.0307 0.0079 0.0308 0.0267 0.0349
Telecommunications 0.0416 0.0634 −0.0485 0.0483 0.1594 0.0963
Utilities 0.0148 0.0511 0.0203 0.0517 0.0076 0.0528
Technology 0.0145 0.0299 0.0227 0.0309 0.0039 0.0322
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included
N 860 400 460
R2 0.41 0.41 0.36
Note. This table presents fixed-effect regression estimation on the relationship board gender diversity, environmental committee and greenhouse gas vol-
untary disclosures. Column 1 provides the baseline results on the relationship between board gender diversity, environmental committee and greenhouse
gas voluntary disclosures. Column 3 reports the relationship between board gender diversity, environmental committee and greenhouse gas voluntary dis-
closures using qualitative data. Column 5 presents the relationship between board gender diversity, environmental committee and greenhouse gas volun-
tary disclosures using quantitative data. Robust standard errors are reported in columns 2, 4, and 6. Detailed definition of all the variables is in Table 1.
Time and industry dummies are included in the estimations, but not reported.
Abbreviation: GHG, greenhouse gas.
*Significant at the 10%.
**Significant at the 5%.
***Significant at the 1%.
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for nonsignificance of environmental committee in explaining GHG
disclosures could be that in practice, such committees do not make
final decisions on matters under their jurisdictions; instead, they do
recommend, and it is up to the board to adopt it or not. In their mixed
method approach, which included interviews, Rodrigue et al. (2013)
reported that informants stated that in practice, decisions to
implement environmental projects are taken by the board as a whole
and not at committee level; hence, this might explain the nonsignifi-
cant effect of the presence of the environmental committee on GHG
voluntary disclosures. Overall, they concluded that environmental
committees are primarily set up to ensure that environmental regula-
tory issues are complied with but ‘are not intended to proactively
TABLE 5 Board gender diversity, environmental committee and greenhouse gas voluntary disclosures using different sources
Annual reports Sustainability reports Websites reports
Weighted GHG disclosure
index
GHG disclosure (DV) Coefficient Robust SE Coefficient Robust SE Coefficient Robust SE Coefficient Robust SE
Board gender diversity 0.4205****** 0.088 0.3388****** 0.3892****** 0.0761 0.0621 0.5612****** 0.0916
Environmental com. 0.0584 0.0403 0.0641 0.0509 0.0439 0.0392 0.0509 0.0439
Board size 0.00623 0.0052 0.0053 0.0079 0.0054 0.0053 0.0079 0.0054
Non-executive directors −0.0777 0.0837 −0.0892 −0.0627 0.0875 0.0879 −0.0627 0.0875
Board meetings 0.0044 0.0037 0.0037 0.0052 0.0039 0.0038 0.0042 0.0039
CEO duality −0.0634 0.0642 −0.0434 −0.0895 0.0605 0.069992 −0.0875 0.0605
Audit committee −0.0009 0.0005 −0.1015 −0.0791 0.0924 0.0934 −0.0791 0.0924
Director ownership −0.003****** 0.0006 −0.003****** −0.002****** 0.0006 0.0007 −0.002****** 0.0006
Ownership concent. −0.0008 0.0005 −0.001 −0.00077 0.0005 0.0006 −0.00077 0.0005
Size 0.0650****** 0.0077 0.0724****** 0.0453****** 0.0083 0.008 0.0454****** 0.0083
Gearing −0.002****** 0.0003 −0.002****** −0.0009****** 0.0003 0.0002 −0.0008****** 0.0003
Profitability 0.0007 0.0006 0.0009 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.006
Liquidity 0.0085 0.0055 0.0080 0.0077 0.0053 0.0059 0.0077 0.0053
Financial slack −0.0023**** 0.0007 −0.0023 −0.0022**** 0.0006 0.0007 −0.0022**** 0.0006
Capital expenditure 0.0086 0.0121 0.0139 0.0006 0.0126 0.0121 0.0006 0.0127
Firm age −0.0149**** 0.0079 −0.020**** −0.0069 0.0082 0.0083 −0.0069 0.0082
CDP participation 0.0996****** 0.0156 0.0966****** 0.1035****** 0.0168 0.0157 0.1035****** 0.0168
Industrials 0.1170****** 0.0285 0.1280****** 0.1037****** 0.0322 0.0297 0.1037****** 0.0322
Consumer services 0.0839****** 0.042 0.0857**** 0.0815**** 0.0345 0.0310 0.0815**** 0.0345
Oil & gas 0.067 0.0367 0.0569 0.068 0.0362 0.0397 0.068 0.0362
Basic materials 0.0913**** 0.0452 0.0835**** 0.12399****** 0.0485 0.0467 0.11309****** 0.0485
Consumer goods 0.027 0.0417 0.0080 0.0307 0.0419 0.0418 0.0377 0.0459
Telecommunications 0.0536 0.0744 −0.0595 0.1604 0.0973 0.0593 0.1604 0.0974
Utilities 0.0258 0.621 0.0313 0.0087 0.0638 0.0627 0.0087 0.0638
Technology 0.0255 0.0309 0.0337 0.0040 0.0432 0.0419 0.0040 0.0432
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
R2 0.40 0.39 0.35 0.34 0.55
N 559 172 129 860
Note. This table presents fixed-effect regression estimation on the relationship board gender diversity, environmental committee and greenhouse gas vol-
untary disclosures using different sources. Column 1 provides the results on the relationship between board gender diversity, environmental committee
and greenhouse gas voluntary disclosures from annual reports. Column 3 reports the effect of the relationship between board gender diversity, environ-
mental committee and greenhouse gas voluntary disclosures from sustainability reports. Column 5 presents effect of the relationship between board gen-
der diversity, environmental committee and greenhouse gas voluntary disclosures from firms website reports. Column 7 provides the results on the
relationship board gender diversity, environmental committee and greenhouse gas voluntary disclosures using weighted GHG disclosure index. Robust
standard errors are reported in columns 2 and 4. Detailed definition of all the variables is in Table 1. Time and industry dummies are included in the estima-
tions, but not reported.
Abbreviation: GHG, greenhouse gas.
*Significant at the 10%.
**Significant at the 5%.
***Significant at the 1%.
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improve environmental performance’. Others such as Liao et al. (2014)
argue that although board environmental committee may decide on
disclosure policy, in practice, the decision as to what is actually dis-
closed could be taken at a lower technical level.
Of the other corporate governance tested here, only director
ownership had a significant (negative) relationship with GHG volun-
tary disclosures meaning more director ownership often leads to less
voluntary disclosure. The lack of significance by most of the ‘tradi-
tional’ board characteristics tested here raises questions about the
role of board structures in discharging wider environmental responsi-
bilities (Kock et al., 2012; Mallin, Michelon, & Raggi, 2013). The results
of the firm-specific control variables also indicate that firm size is posi-
tively associated with GHG voluntary disclosures. This is consistent
with prior studies on GHG disclosures such as Freedman and
Jaggi (2005), Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009), Rankin et al. (2011) and
Berthelot and Robert (2012). The negative coefficient in respect of
gearing means that highly geared firms are likely to provide less GHG
voluntary disclosures. Although the result contradicts findings of prior
studies on GHG disclosures (see Freedman & Jaggi, 2005; Prado-
Lorenzo et al., 2009; Rankin et al., 2011), it is consistent with the find-
ings of Brammer and Pavelin (2008). Finally, our results also show that
participation in CDP and three industrial sectors (industrials, consumer
services and basic materials) is significantly associated with GHG vol-
untary disclosures.
5 | ADDITIONAL RESULTS AND
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
5.1 | Alternative measures of GHG disclosures—
Qualitative versus quantitative disclosures
In order to further examine the sensitivity of our analysis to alterna-
tive measure of GHG disclosures, we decompose our dependent vari-
able into qualitative and quantitative GHG disclosures to see if the
effect of female board members and the environmental committee is
different on each of these compared to overall GHG voluntary disclo-
sures. In environment and climate change disclosures, in particular,
prior literature documents evidence of symbolic disclosure or green-
washing or simply legitimation disclosures (Hrasky, 2012). Under
greenwashing or what Marquis and Toffel (2012) term ‘attention
deflection’ disclosures, firms disclose by highlighting certain desirable
activities or their intention to do something as a way of avoiding scru-
tiny in their actual practices. Thus, under greenwashing, organisational
disclosures are awash with positive environmental attributes or initia-
tives, whereas negative ones are concealed. Disclosures of this nature
are often qualitative rather than quantitative.
Previous evidence suggests that analysis of disclosures in differ-
ent categories provides comprehensive and richer insights into disclo-
sure quantity and that this help to profile different disclosure
strategies employed by firms (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004). In all
models, we expect the direction of the relationship to remain the
same. Columns 3 and 5 of Table 4 presents the findings of the rela-
tionship between board gender diversity, environmental committee
and GHG voluntary disclosures using both qualitative and quantitative
data, respectively. Results in the two models, that is, 1b and 1c of
Table 4, do not materially differ from the model 1a. Both board gen-
der diversity and environmental committee maintained their original
model status. The only notable difference is in respect of financial
slack and firm age in that the latter is significant with qualitative dis-
closures but not quantitative disclosures whereas the former is signifi-
cant in respect of quantitative but not qualitative disclosures.
TABLE 6 Female prediction model residual on GHG voluntary
disclosure
GHG disclosure (DV) Coefficient Robust SE
Board gender diver. (residual) 0.3141****** 0.0847
Environmental commit. 0.0466 0.0264
Board size 0.0059 0.0037
Non-executive directors −0.0532 0.0702
Board meetings 0.0026 0.0025
CEO Duality −0.0476 0.0527
Audit committee −0.0639 0.0789
Director ownership −0.0017**** 0.0006
Ownership concentrate. −0.0012**** 0.0004
Size 0.0551****** 0.0071
Gearing −0.0011**** 0.0005
Profitability 0.0007 0.0005
Liquidity 0.0069 0.0051
Financial slack −0.0014 0.0009
Capital expenditure 0.0075 0.0119
Firm age −0.0163**** 0.0071
CDP participation 0.1062****** 0.0161
Industrials 0.1155****** 0.0374
Consumer services 0.0966**** 0.0373
Oil & gas 0.047 0.0428
Basic materials 0.0828**** 0.0415
Consumer goods 0.032 0.0396
Telecommunications 0.0541 0.0582
Utilities 0.0271 0.0521
Technology 0.0214 0.0426
Year dummies Included Included
R2 0.41
N 860
Note. This table reports fixed-effect residual regression estimation on the
relationship between board gender diversity, environmental committee
and greenhouse gas voluntary disclosures using female director model
residual. Robust standard errors are reported in column 2. Detailed defini-
tion of all the variables is in Table 1. Time and industry dummies are
included in the estimations, but not reported.
Abbreviation: GHG, greenhouse gas.
*Significant at the 10%.
**Significant at the 5%.
***Significant at the 1%.
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5.2 | Alternative measures of GHG disclosures'
three main sources of information
In addition, we also run further analysis to compare the sensitivity of
our analysis to the three main sources of information used to con-
struct our main GHG disclosure index. The focus of this analysis is to
determine which source provides better information to stakeholders.
We also, using these three main sources, constructed the weighted
average disclosure index as another alternative measure of GHC dis-
closure. The evidence presented in Table 6 shows a less statistical dif-
ference from previous estimations. We find the evidence to be more
pronounced from reports presented from company annual reports.
5.3 | Female prediction model residual on GHG
voluntary disclosure
We further illustrate the influence of board gender diversity on disclo-
sure decisions by estimating a predictive model for board gender
diversity and then examining the unexplained percentage of gender
diversity on GHG voluntary disclosure. In this case, we take board
gender diversity as a linear combination of both governance and firm
characteristics. Adams and Ferreira (2009) argued that the inclusion of
women on board is often influenced by the peculiar characteristics of
the firm. In their sample, Adams and Ferreira (2009) report that female
director participation had varied greatly depending on industrial classi-
fication with those firms in consumer goods having more female
directors than firms in energy and infrastructure sector. Impliedly that
if the same firm characteristics used to explain variation in GHG vol-
untary disclosure can also help explain variation in gender, then board
gender diversity is simply a proxy of those characteristics (Gul
et al., 2011). If the unexplained part of board gender diversity explains
most of the variation in GHG voluntary disclosures, then causality
effects may be argued for.
The model is estimated as follows:
fbit = αi + β
ec:xec it + β
aud:xaud it + β
ceod:xceod it + β
ned:xned it + β
bm:xbm it
+ βbs:xbs it + β
do:xdo it + β
ow:xow it + β
s:xs it + β
gea:xgea it + β
roa:xroa it
+ β liq:x liq it + β
fslack:xfslack i + β
capex:xcapexit + β
fage:xfage it + β
ind:x ind it
+ βcdp:xcdp it + μit:
ð4Þ
Using the μit, which is the unexplained part in the female prediction
model, the main model is re-estimated using this residual as follows:
Yit= αi + βfbresid:xfbresid it + βec:xec it + βaud:xaud it + βceod:xceod it + βned:
xned it + β
bm:xbm it + β
bs:xbs it + β
do:xdo it + β
ow:xow it + β
s:xs it + β
gea:
xgea it + β
roa:xroa it + β
liq:xliq it + β
fslack:xfslacki + β
capex:xcapexit + β
fage:
xfage it + β
ind:xind it + β
cdp:xcdp it +
X4
αt + μit:
ð5Þ
Column 1 of Table 5 reports fixed-effect residual regression estima-
tion on the relationship between board gender diversity,
environmental committee and GHG voluntary disclosures using
female director model residual. The results indicate that the residual is
positive and significant with GHG voluntary disclosures and the envi-
ronmental committee maintaining its nonsignificance. This is consis-
tent with our initial findings presented in column 1 of Table 4.
TABLE 7 Corporate governance legislation, board gender
diversity and greenhouse gas voluntary disclosures
Legislation
GHG disclosure (DV) Coefficient Robust SE
Board gender diversity 0.288****** 0.066
Environmental com. 0.041 0.0329
Board size 0.0032 0.0033
Non-executive directors −0.0812 0.0675
Board meetings 0.0036 0.0038
CEO duality −0.0424 0.0685
Audit committee −0.1114 0.0714
Director ownership −0.001****** 0.0006
Ownership concent. −0.0009 0.0005
Size 0.0714****** 0.0082
Gearing −0.002****** 0.0003
Profitability 0.0007 0.0006
Liquidity 0.0099 0.0032
Financial slack −0.0022 0.0006
Capital expenditure 0.0138 0.0117
Firm age −0.0290**** 0.0061
CDP participation 0.10055****** 0.0168
Industrials 0.1378****** 0.0411
Consumer services 0.0747**** 0.0434
Oil & gas 0.0758 0.0361
Basic materials 0.0825**** 0.0415
Consumer goods 0.00811 0.0447
Telecommunications −0.0495 0.0853
Utilities 0.0303 0.0627
Technology 0.0327 0.042
Prelegislation × Board gender diversity 0.090******
Year dummies Included Included
R2 0.41
N 420
Note. This table presents fixed-effect regression estimation on the impact
of the UK corporate governance code on the relationship between board
gender diversity, environmental committee and greenhouse gas voluntary
disclosures. Column 1 provides the results of the impact of the corporate
governance legislation on the relationship between board gender diversity,
environmental committee and greenhouse gas voluntary disclosures.
Detailed definition of all the variables is in Table 1. Time and industry
dummies are included in the estimations, but not reported.
*Significant at the 10%.
**Significant at the 5%.
***Significant at the 1%.
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5.4 | Heterogeneity identification using industrial
reclassification and corporate governance code
Also, based on our literature review, we noted that the industry vari-
able is categorised differently. For example, Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009)
had 11 categories; Rankin et al. (2011) had four; and Freedman and
Jaggi (2005) had five. Our original model had industry variable cat-
egorised as per industry classification benchmark, which resulted in
nine distinct industries after excluding financial sector industry. We,
therefore, reclassified our industry variable into just one dummy vari-
able identifying firms as either environmentally sensitive or not
(Thompson, 1998); this resulted in 79 firms being classified as envi-
ronmentally sensitive. When the model is run again, the results did
not materially differ from our models (in that neither the direction nor
significance of the explanatory variables changed). Results are not
included here but are available on request.
Further, we investigated the effect of corporate governance
code on the relationship between board diversity, environmental
committee and GHG disclosure. Given the fact that the UK Corpo-
rate Governance Code emphasised gender diversity in 2012, our
focus has been to determine whether the code could explain the
variation of the relationship between board gender diversity, envi-
ronmental committee and GHG disclosure. In order to achieve this,
we constructed a dummy variable 1 2012-2014 and any other
period 0. Further, we interacted the corporate governance code var-
iable with gender diversity in order to determine its impact on GHG
disclosure. Evidence presented in Table 7 suggests a positive and
significant relationship between GHG disclosure and the interactive
term for the corporate governance code and board diversity. The
evidence suggests that the adoption of the corporate governance
code in 2012 had positive influence on the impact of board diver-
sity on the GHG disclosures.
5.5 | Endogeneity concerns
One problem we foresee in our findings is the issue of endogeneity.
The literature suggests that socially responsible firms tend to be more
gender diverse and suggests that gender diversity drives GHG
(i.e., social responsibility), implying that causality might occur in the
reverse direction. Also, we envisage that some omitted variables that
are correlated with both gender diversity and GHG may bias our esti-
mates towards our baseline results. To address these potential endo-
geneity issues, we employ the two-stage least square procedure,
which has widely been used. Adams and Ferreira (2009) advocate the
use of a 2SLS as a technique to deal with simultaneity and other
endogeneity problems. The results of the first-stage and second-stage
regression results are presented in Table 8. Using a series of valid
instruments, results from our 2SLS estimation further provide support
for our main hypotheses of a significantly positive association
between GHC voluntary disclosures and gender diversity. The result
presented in Table 8 implies that our results remain relevant after
controlling for endogeneity.
6 | CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we examine the relationship between two modern gov-
ernance mechanisms, the board gender diversity and the environmen-
tal committees, with GHG voluntary disclosures through the lenses of
the stakeholder, resource dependency and legitimacy theoretical
frameworks.
Our results document a strong positive relationship between
board gender diversity and GHG voluntary disclosures, which is con-
sistent with prior evidence (Ciocirlan & Pettersson, 2012; Liao
et al., 2014; Post et al., 2011) and constitutes an important input to
the ongoing debate about the role of women in the boardroom. While
there is a global momentum on reforming boards of directors to incor-
porate women, questions have still lingered around the added value
of women in a board of directors (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). Our
results contribute to this debate by showing that a gender-diverse
board can serve a wider and a more diverse range of stakeholders
(Carter et al., 2010; Liao et al., 2014) and that women can perform
better in dealing with environmental matters than men as they tend
to be more sensitive to social issues (Bernardi et al., 2006).
As regards environmental committees, these are found to have
no significant influence on GHG voluntary disclosures. This holds also
true for several other traditional governance structure variables.
These findings add to the growing empirical evidence in the literature
that questions the effectiveness of the current board structures in
TABLE 8 Board gender diversity, environmental committee and
greenhouse gas voluntary disclosures using two stage least square
estimation
First stage
estimations
Second stage
estimations
(1) (2)
Board gender
diversity GHG disclosure
Predicted value 0.763****** (17.86)
Environmental Com. −0.0566******
(−5.60)
−0.0311 (−0.82)
Controls Yes Yes
Year and industry effects
included
Yes Yes
N 860 860
Adjusted R2 0.65 0.75
Note. This table presents results of the relationship board gender diversity,
environmental committee and greenhouse gas voluntary disclosures using
two stage least square estimations. Column 1 reports the first stage esti-
mations on the effect of greenhouse gas voluntary disclosures on board
gender diversity. Column 2 presents the second-stage estimations.
Detailed definition of all the variables is in Table 1. Year and industry
dummies and control variables are included in the estimations, but not
reported. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.
*Significant at the 10%.
**Significant at the 5%.
***Significant at the 1%.
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serving the wider needs of stakeholders and in addressing the relevant
issues on climate change. In line with our results, Wang and
Hussainey (2013) argue that it is debatable as to whether certain gov-
ernance characteristics like the establishment of environmental com-
mittees as advocated by the UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC,
2012) can effectively improve environmental reporting. Prado-
Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez (2010) call for a review of the gover-
nance codes to ensure that the updated codes include clauses and
introduce mechanisms that consider the broader interests of stake-
holders (other than shareholders).
The results reported in our paper should be interpreted in the
light of the following limitations. First, our focus on the FTSE 350 firms
and the exclusion of financial firms from our sample means that
results can neither be generalised to the UK firms nor applied to the
financial services industry. Second, the archival data we utilise in our
empirical analysis do not allow us to capture the dynamics in the
stakeholders' views about gender diversity, environment committees
and GHG voluntary disclosures. It is, therefore, important for the cur-
rent research to be complemented by studies that use primary data or
mixed methodologies that may reflect the relevant views.
Despite these limitations, our results contribute to the existing lit-
erature in the following ways. The finding that board gender diversity
exerts a positive effect on the GHG voluntary disclosures suggests
that firms should be encouraged to have more women on their boards
to improve the relevant disclosure practices. The noneffectiveness of
the environmental committees and other corporate governance mech-
anisms in enhancing the GHG voluntary disclosures shows that firms
may not have to directly link the existing mechanisms with their dis-
closure decisions.
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